Financing patterns in transition economies: Privatized former SOEs versus ab initio private firms

被引:14
作者
Liu, Yu [1 ]
Sah, Nilesh [2 ]
Ullah, Barkat [3 ]
Wei, Zuobao [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Texas Rio Grande Valley, Edinburg, TX USA
[2] Univ Tennessee, Chattanooga, TN USA
[3] Morgan State Univ, Baltimore, MD 21251 USA
[4] Univ Texas El Paso, El Paso, TX 79968 USA
关键词
Privatization; Financing pattern; Transition economy; Institutional development; Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS); POLITICAL CONNECTIONS; GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP; GROWTH; CONSTRAINTS; GOVERNANCE; STATE; LAW; DETERMINANTS; INSTITUTIONS; PERFORMANCE;
D O I
10.1016/j.ememar.2020.100680
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We employ 37,987 firms in 30 transition economies to investigate the relation between the origins of private firms and their financing patterns. We find that relative to ab initio (from the beginning) private firms, privatized former state-owned enterprises (SOEs) finance a higher proportion of their fixed assets from bank finance (especially from state-owned banks) and supplier credit. We argue that privatized former SOEs continue to benefit from the political and financial connections established during their SOE era. We document that country governance, financial development and legal origins play an important role in the financing patterns of privatized versus private firms.
引用
收藏
页数:20
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