Key substitution attacks on some provably secure signature schemes

被引：0

作者：

Tan, CH ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Nanyang Technol Univ, Sch Elect & Elect Engn, Singapore 2263, Singapore

来源：

IEICE TRANSACTIONS ON FUNDAMENTALS OF ELECTRONICS COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER SCIENCES | 2004年 / E87A卷 / 01期

关键词：

cryptography; key substitution attacks;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

Recently, Camenisch et al. and Fischlin proposed provably secure signature schemes in the standard models respectively. In this letter, we propose key substitution attacks on these two signature schemes. We show that an adversary can generate a valid public key corresponding to a legitimate signature.

引用

页码：226 / 227

页数：2

共 8 条

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[2]

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[3]

Camenisch J, 2003, LECT NOTES COMPUT SC, V2576, P268

[4]

Fischlin M, 2003, LECT NOTES COMPUT SC, V2567, P116

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[6]

Gennaro R, 1999, LECT NOTES COMPUT SC, V1592, P123

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[8]

MENEZES A, SECURITY SIGNATURE S

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