Managerial Payoff and Gift-Exchange in the Field

被引：7
作者：
Englmaier, Florian [1 ]
Leider, Stephen [2 ]
机构：
[1] Dept Econom, Organizations Res Grp, LMU Munich, Kaulbachstrasse 45, DE-80539 Munich, Germany
[2] Univ Michigan, Ross Sch Business, Technol & Operat Dept, 701 Tappan St R4424, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
来源：
REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 2020年 / 56卷 / 02期
基金：
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词：
Incentives; Field experiments; Gift-exchange; Reciprocity; RECIPROCITY; PERSONALITY; ECONOMICS; FAIRNESS; WORKERS;
D O I：
10.1007/s11151-019-09737-y
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We conduct a field experiment where we vary both the presence of a gift-exchange wage and the effect of the worker's effort on the manager's payoff. Results indicate a strong complementarity between the initial wage-gift and the agent's ability to "repay the gift". We control for differences in ability and reciprocal inclination and show that gift-exchange is more effective with more reciprocal agents. We present a principal-agent model with reciprocal subjects that motivates our findings. Our results help to reconcile the conflicting evidence on the efficacy of gift-exchange outside the lab.
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页码：259 / 280
页数：22
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