Garbled Protocols and Two-Round MPC from Bilinear Maps

被引:40
作者
Garg, Sanjam [1 ]
Srinivasan, Akshayaram [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Comp Sci, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
来源
2017 IEEE 58TH ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM ON FOUNDATIONS OF COMPUTER SCIENCE (FOCS) | 2017年
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Circuit Garbling; Bilinear Maps; Universal Composability; OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER; CRYPTOGRAPHY; COMPUTATION;
D O I
10.1109/FOCS.2017.60
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
In this paper, we initiate the study of garbled protocols -a generalization of Yao's garbled circuits construction to distributed protocols. More specifically, in a garbled protocol construction, each party can independently generate a garbled protocol component along with pairs of input labels. Additionally, it generates an encoding of its input. The evaluation procedure takes as input the set of all garbled protocol components and the labels corresponding to the input encodings of all parties and outputs the entire transcript of the distributed protocol. We provide constructions for garbling arbitrary protocols based on standard computational assumptions on bilinear maps (in the common random string model). Next, using garbled protocols we obtain a general compiler that compresses any arbitrary round multiparty secure computation protocol into a two-round UC secure protocol. Previously, two-round multiparty secure computation protocols were only known assuming witness encryption or learning-with errors. Benefiting from our generic approach we also obtain protocols (i) for the setting of random access machines (RAM programs) while keeping communication and computational costs proportional to running times, while (ii) making only a black-box use of the underlying group, eliminating the need for any expensive non-black-box group operations. Our results are obtained by a simple but powerful extension of the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system of Groth, Ostrovsky and Sahai [Journal of ACM, 2012].
引用
收藏
页码:588 / 599
页数:12
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