The Politics of Minister Retention in Presidential Systems: Technocrats, Partisans, and Government Approval

被引:48
作者
Camerlo, Marcelo [1 ]
Perez-Linan, Anibal [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Lisbon, Inst Social Sci, P-1699 Lisbon, Portugal
[2] Univ Pittsburgh, Polit Sci, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA
关键词
D O I
10.5129/001041515814709310
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
This article examines the impact of presidential approval and individual minister profiles on minister turnover. It claims that in order to prioritize sustainable policy performance and cabinet loyalty, government chiefs protect and remove technocrats, partisans, and outsider ministers conditional on government approval. The study offers an operational definition of minister profiles that relies on fuzzy-set measures of technical expertise and political affiliation, and tests the hypotheses using survival analysis with an original dataset for the Argentine case (1983-2011). The findings show that popular presidents are likely to protect experts more than partisan ministers, but not outsiders.
引用
收藏
页码:315 / +
页数:20
相关论文
共 22 条
[1]   Breaking the parliamentary chain of delegation: Presidents and non-partisan cabinet members in European democracies [J].
Amorim Neto, Octavio ;
Strom, Kaare .
BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 2006, 36 :619-643
[2]  
[Anonymous], 2005, PRESIDENTIALIZATION
[3]  
[Anonymous], 2008, CABINETS COALITION B
[4]   MINISTERIAL EXPERTISE AND THE DUTCH CASE [J].
BAKEMA, WE ;
SECKER, IP .
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, 1988, 16 (02) :153-170
[5]  
Berlinski Samuel., 2012, ACCOUNTING MINISTERS
[6]  
Camerlo Marcelo, 2013, ICS WORKING PAPERS
[7]  
Carlin Ryan E., 2012, PROBLEMS CONFRONTING, P203
[8]  
Centeno MiguelA., 1998, POLITICS EXPERTISE L
[9]  
de Almeida Pedro Tavares, 2004, WHO GOVERNS SO EUROP
[10]  
de la Torre Carlos, 2013, LAT AM RES REV, V48, P25