The end of explanation: Kant on the unconditioned

Human reason demands ultimate explanation; it demands a Because that admits of no further Because - something unconditioned. Pace dogmatic rationalist metaphysics, Kant concludes that theoretical reason must remain modest; it cannot know or cognize the existence of particular unconditioned entities (e.g. God or Leibnizian monads). The prevailing view goes even further; it maintains that theoretical reason cannot even know that something or other unconditioned exists. Yet I argue that Kant's critique contains an ambitious conclusion: reason can know that something unconditioned exists among things in themselves, even if it cannot know which particular unconditioned entities exist. I reconstruct Kant's argument for this ambitious conclusion. On my reconstruction, the argument turns on a key metaphysical assumption about things in themselves: that they are completely determinate. And far from undermining Kant's case for modesty, I suggest, this assumption partly underlies it.