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Preferences for harmony and minority voting
被引:2
|作者:
Fahrenberger, Theresa C.
[1
]
Gersbach, Hans
[1
]
机构:
[1] ETH, CER ETH, Ctr Econ Res, CH-8092 Zurich, Switzerland
关键词:
FAIRNESS;
D O I:
10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.06.002
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
We examine repeated collective decisions in which people care about how others are treated. We formulate the notion of preferences for harmony as the desire of a person that others should not suffer repeatedly from the tyranny of majorities. We suggest that minority voting is a suitable scheme for such problems. Under such a scheme, only members of the minority in one decision are allowed to vote in the next decision. We discuss a variety of applications and avenues for future research. (C) 2011 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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页码:1 / 13
页数:13
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