Belief revision and projection in the epistemic situation calculus

被引:5
|
作者
Schwering, Christoph [1 ]
Lakemeyer, Gerhard [2 ]
Pagnucco, Maurice [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ New South Wales, Sch Comp Sci & Engn, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia
[2] Rhein Westfal TH Aachen, Dept Comp Sci, D-52056 Aachen, Germany
关键词
Knowledge representation; Reasoning about actions; Belief revision; FRAME PROBLEM; RAMSEY TEST; KNOWLEDGE; LOGIC; CONDITIONALS; OPERATORS; DATABASE; PROGRESS;
D O I
10.1016/j.artint.2017.07.004
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
This article considers defeasible beliefs in dynamic settings. In particular, we examine the belief projection problem: what is believed after performing an action and/or receiving new information? The approach is based on an epistemic variant of Reiter's situation calculus, where actions not only have physical effects but may also provide new information to the agent. The preferential belief structure is initially determined using conditional statements. New information is then incorporated using two popular belief revision schemes, namely natural and lexicographic revision. The projection problem is solved twofold in this formalism: by goal regression and by knowledge base progression. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:62 / 97
页数:36
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