Green Supply Chain Decisions Considering Consumers' Low-Carbon Awareness under Different Government Subsidies

被引:58
作者
Su, Chang [1 ]
Liu, Xiaojing [2 ]
Du, Wenyi [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Yangtze Normal Univ, Sch Finance & Econ, Chongqing 408100, Peoples R China
[2] Jiangsu Normal Univ, Business Sch, Xuzhou 221116, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
[3] Hohai Univ, Business Sch, Nanjing 211100, Peoples R China
[4] Hohai Univ, Management Sci Inst, Nanjing 211100, Peoples R China
关键词
green supply chain; government subsidies; consumers' low-carbon behavior; power structure; Stackelberg game; CAP-AND-TRADE; EMISSION REDUCTION; ENVIRONMENTAL AWARENESS; COORDINATION; POLICIES; UNCERTAINTY; CONSUMPTION; CONTRACTS;
D O I
10.3390/su12062281
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
This study examined how to arrange the generation and pricing of supply chain members in the case of consumer green preference with different government subsidies. The green supply chain comprises a manufacturer and a retailer; the government subsidizes manufacturers who produce green products and consumers who buy green products. The study built a green supply chain pricing decision model with different forms of subsidy under various power structures. By backward induction and sensitivity analysis, this study analyzed optimal strategies of green supply chain under various modes, and we discuss how the government subsidy coefficient affects the optimal decision of a green supply chain. The results show that, firstly, whether the government subsidizes the manufacturers or the consumers, the wholesale price offered by the manufacturer is directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the two power structures. Secondly, when the government subsidizes the manufacturer, the carbon-emission level and the retail price are inversely proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the manufacturer leader; the carbon-emission level and the retail price are all directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the retailer leader. Finally, when the government subsidizes the consumers, the carbon-emission level and the retail price are directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the two power structures.
引用
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页数:12
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