An evolutionary game-theoretic approach to study the technological transformation of the industrial sector toward renewable electricity procurement: A case study of Iran

被引:48
作者
Jamali, Mohammad-Bagher [1 ]
Rasti-Barzoki, Morteza [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Khosroshahi, Hossein [1 ]
Altmann, Jorn [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Isfahan Univ Technol, Dept Ind & Syst Engn, Esfahan 8415683111, Iran
[2] Seoul Natl Univ, Inst Engn Res IOER, Coll Engn, Seoul 08826, South Korea
[3] Seoul Natl Univ, Coll Engn, Technol Management Econ & Policy Program, Seoul 08826, South Korea
基金
新加坡国家研究基金会;
关键词
Technological transformation; Electricity demand; Government; Pricing; Evolutionary game theory; SUPPLY CHAIN; CONSUMER-BEHAVIOR; INVESTIGATE; DECISIONS; DEMAND; DESIGN; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1016/j.apenergy.2022.119083
中图分类号
TE [石油、天然气工业]; TK [能源与动力工程];
学科分类号
0807 ; 0820 ;
摘要
Electricity shortages severely affect the production chain and cause damage to manufacturing productivity. This study examines how the industrial sector can transform technological innovations toward renewable electricity procurement. We consider two strategies for manufacturers: purchasing electricity from a technology-based supplier (TB strategy) and purchasing it from a non-technology-based supplier (NTB strategy). Manufacturers need technological transformation, such as upgrading their electrical system toward digitalization to manage power outages. We examine manufacturers' pricing decisions and their long-term behavior to adopt the TB and NTB strategies using a one-population evolutionary game-theoretic approach. Also, we investigate the majority of manufacturers' population that eventually choose the best strategy. Moreover, we apply the present model to real-world cases of Iran's cement, steel, and paper industries. The results show that the evolutionary behavior of sectors with high annual electricity consumption, such as steel, converges to the TB strategy faster than cement and paper industries. In contrast, the cement and paper industries are more sensitive to subsidy allocation than the steel industry with respect to electricity procurement strategies.
引用
收藏
页数:14
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