Corporate governance and default risk in financial firms over the post-financial crisis period: International evidence

被引:52
作者
Switzer, Lorne N. [1 ]
Tu, Qiao [1 ]
Wang, Jun [2 ]
机构
[1] Concordia Univ, John Molson Sch Business, Finance Dept, Montreal, PQ, Canada
[2] Univ Western Ontario, DAN Dept Management & Org Studies, London, ON, Canada
关键词
Institutional investors; Default risk; Corporate governance; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; BANK PERFORMANCE; OWNERSHIP; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1016/j.intfin.2017.09.023
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper investigates the relationship between default risk and corporate governance for financial firms in 28 countries outside of North America in the post-financial crisis period, where default risk is measured by both credit default swap (CDS) spreads and estimated by a Merton-type model. Reduced default risk helps the stock market rebound during the post-crisis period. Both internal governance variables, including institutional and insider ownership, board composition and CEO power, and external regulatory factors, are examined and they show significant effect on default risk. In addition, the impacts of various governance variables are continent-specific: they have a higher impact on default risk for Asian firms than for European firms. Regulatory factors are important moderators of the governance mechanisms for banks: higher Tier 1 capital ratios reduce both CDS and fundamental default risk; recipients of secret emergency loans from the US Federal Reserve System (the Fed) exhibit lower CDS spreads post-crisis but higher fundamental default probabilities. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:196 / 210
页数:15
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