The women of Cairo - Equilibria in large anonymous games

被引:11
作者
Blonski, M [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Frankfurt, Dept Econ, D-60054 Frankfurt, Germany
关键词
large games; anonymous games; co-ordination problem; equilibrium characterization;
D O I
10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.10.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In this article, I characterize Nash equilibria of large anonymous games by providing the following neccessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium distribution: for no subset K of actions more players play actions in K than have a best response in K to the given distribution. While neccessity is trivial the proof for sufficiency relies on a theorem by [Math. Proc. Camb. Philos. Soc. 78 (1974) 323] which is an extension of Hall's theorem or the marriage lemma well known from graph theory. The veiling problem for the women of Cairo serves as an illustrating heuristic example explaining the nature of the result. (c) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:253 / 264
页数:12
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