机构:
Max Planck Inst Res Collect Goods, Kurt Schumacher Str 10, D-53113 Bonn, GermanyMax Planck Inst Res Collect Goods, Kurt Schumacher Str 10, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
Cerrone, Claudia
[1
]
Manna, Ester
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Barcelona, Dept Econ Theory, Ave Diagonal 696, Barcelona 08034, SpainMax Planck Inst Res Collect Goods, Kurt Schumacher Str 10, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
Manna, Ester
[2
]
机构:
[1] Max Planck Inst Res Collect Goods, Kurt Schumacher Str 10, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
B E JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS & POLICY
|
2018年
/
18卷
/
01期
关键词:
adverse selection;
intrinsic motivation;
individual and team incentives;
WORKERS MOTIVATION;
JOB-SATISFACTION;
TEAMS;
INCENTIVES;
COOPERATION;
IMPACT;
D O I:
10.1515/bejeap-2017-0190
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
Heterogeneity in intrinsic motivation affects the optimal contract offered to employees in teams. Under individual incentives, the effort exerted by both motivated and selfish employees is distorted. This distortion is mitigated if employees receive a wage based on team performance. As a result, the principal prefers to use team incentives, while motivated employees are better off with individual incentives.
机构:
German Sport Univ Cologne, Cologne, Germany
German Sport Univ Cologne, Dept Sport Econ & Sport Management, Sportpk Muengersdorf 6, D-50933 Cologne, GermanyGerman Sport Univ Cologne, Cologne, Germany
Dallmeyer, Soeren
Breuer, Christoph
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h-index: 0
机构:
German Sport Univ Cologne, Cologne, GermanyGerman Sport Univ Cologne, Cologne, Germany
机构:
German Sport Univ Cologne, Cologne, Germany
German Sport Univ Cologne, Dept Sport Econ & Sport Management, Sportpk Muengersdorf 6, D-50933 Cologne, GermanyGerman Sport Univ Cologne, Cologne, Germany
Dallmeyer, Soeren
Breuer, Christoph
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
German Sport Univ Cologne, Cologne, GermanyGerman Sport Univ Cologne, Cologne, Germany