Pay for Performance with Motivated Employees

被引：0

作者：

Cerrone, Claudia ^{[1
]}

Manna, Ester ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Max Planck Inst Res Collect Goods, Kurt Schumacher Str 10, D-53113 Bonn, Germany

[2] Univ Barcelona, Dept Econ Theory, Ave Diagonal 696, Barcelona 08034, Spain

来源：

B E JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS & POLICY | 2018年 / 18卷 / 01期

关键词：

adverse selection; intrinsic motivation; individual and team incentives; WORKERS MOTIVATION; JOB-SATISFACTION; TEAMS; INCENTIVES; COOPERATION; IMPACT;

D O I：

10.1515/bejeap-2017-0190

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Heterogeneity in intrinsic motivation affects the optimal contract offered to employees in teams. Under individual incentives, the effort exerted by both motivated and selfish employees is distorted. This distortion is mitigated if employees receive a wage based on team performance. As a result, the principal prefers to use team incentives, while motivated employees are better off with individual incentives.

引用

页数：8

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