Social welfare analysis of investment public-private partnership approaches for transportation projects

被引:43
作者
Rouhani, Omid M. [1 ]
Geddes, R. Richard [2 ]
Gao, H. Oliver [3 ,4 ]
Bel, Germa [5 ]
机构
[1] McGill Univ, Dept Civil Engn & Appl Mech, 817 Sherbrooke St West, Montreal, PQ, Canada
[2] Cornell Univ, Dept Policy Anal & Management, 251 Martha Van Rensselaer Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
[3] Cornell Univ, Sch Civil & Environm Engn, Hollister Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
[4] Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Antai Coll Econ & Management, Sino US Global Logist Inst, Shanghai 200030, Peoples R China
[5] Univ Barcelona, Dept Polit Econ, Avd Diagonal 690, Barcelona 08034, Spain
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Social welfare analysis; Investment public private partnerships; Residents; Road concession; Urban transportation systems; Road pricing; SOLID-WASTE; PRIVATIZATION; NETWORK; POLICY; SCHEMES; FRESNO; COSTS; TOLLS; ROADS;
D O I
10.1016/j.tra.2015.11.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper has two objectives: (i) to introduce a new approach in order to gain widespread support for road pricing; and (ii) to develop a detailed social welfare analysis for road pricing schemes. We first describe our novel approach that stimulates public support for road pricing, which we refer to as an investment public-private partnership, or IP3. This approach returns a significant portion of the economic value created by road pricing back to the citizens who own the newly priced facility. We then present a social welfare framework that estimates the benefits and costs of using the IP3 approach on an urban transportation network. A P3 project's impact on overall social welfare provides a more comprehensive evaluation criterion than the often-used Value for Money (VfM) analysis. Apart from several theoretical studies, a detailed social welfare analysis that includes all major P3 project stakeholders is absent from the literature. We use Fresno, California as our case study in order to conduct a welfare analysis on IP3s. Our results show that system-optimal tolling favors average users, but that government and consequently taxpayers should pay for costly tolling systems (negative profits). In contrast, unlimited profit-maximizing tolls raise substantial profits for government, for the infrastructure's citizen-owners, and for the private sector, but the average user is worse off. From a social-welfare perspective, one should search for a Pareto improvement under which all major stakeholders are better off. Our estimates indicate that a mixed public and private tolling scheme offers such an improvement. (C) 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
引用
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页码:86 / 103
页数:18
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