Transparency and Tax Evasion: Evidence from the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)

被引:40
作者
De Simone, Lisa [1 ]
Lester, Rebecca [1 ]
Markle, Kevin [2 ]
机构
[1] Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] Univ Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242 USA
关键词
F42; H24; H26; M48; tax evasion; automatic exchange of information; cross-border deposits; investment; offshore locations; INCOME; CONSEQUENCES; INVESTMENTS; ENFORCEMENT;
D O I
10.1111/1475-679X.12293
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine how U.S. individuals respond to regulation intended to reduce offshore tax evasion. The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) requires foreign financial institutions to report information to the U.S. government regarding U.S. account holders. We first document an average $7.8 billion to $15.3 billion decrease in equity foreign portfolio investment to the United States from tax-haven countries after FATCA implementation, consistent with a decrease in "round-tripping" investments attributable to U.S. investors' offshore tax evasion. When testing total worldwide investment out of financial accounts in tax havens post-FATCA, we find an average decline of $56.6 billion to $78.0 billion. We next provide evidence of other important consequences of this regulation, including increased expatriations of U.S. citizens and greater investment in alternative assets not subject to FATCA reporting, such as residential real estate and artwork. Our study contributes to both the academic literature and policy analysis on regulation, tax evasion, and crime.
引用
收藏
页码:105 / 153
页数:49
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