Monetary incentives increase COVID-19 vaccinations

被引：214

作者：

Campos-Mercade, Pol ^{[1
]}

Meier, Armando N. ^{[2
,3
]}

Schneider, Florian H. ^{[4
]}

Meier, Stephan ^{[5
]}

Pope, Devin ^{[6
,7
]}

Wengstrom, Erik ^{[8
,9
,10
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Copenhagen, Ctr Econ Behav & Inequal CEBI, Dept Econ, Copenhagen, Denmark

[2] Univ Lausanne, Unisante, Lausanne, Switzerland

[3] Univ Basel, Fac Business & Econ, Basel, Switzerland

[4] Univ Zurich, Dept Econ, Zurich, Switzerland

[5] Columbia Univ, Columbia Business Sch, New York, NY 10027 USA

[6] Univ Chicago, Booth Sch Business, Chicago, IL 60637 USA

[7] NBER, Boston, MA 02138 USA

[8] Lund Univ, Dept Econ, Lund, Sweden

[9] Hanken Sch Econ, Dept Finance & Econ, Helsinki, Finland

[10] Lund Univ, Knut Wicksell Ctr Financial Studies, Lund, Sweden

来源：

SCIENCE | 2021年 / 374卷 / 6569期

基金：

新加坡国家研究基金会; 瑞士国家科学基金会;

关键词：

VACCINE; REWARDS;

D O I：

10.1126/science.abm0475

中图分类号：

O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];

学科分类号：

07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;

摘要：

The stalling of COVID-19 vaccination rates threatens public health. To increase vaccination rates, governments across the world are considering the use of monetary incentives. Here we present evidence about the effect of guaranteed payments on COVID-19 vaccination uptake. We ran a large preregistered randomized controlled trial (with 8286 participants) in Sweden and linked the data to population-wide administrative vaccination records. We found that modest monetary payments of 24 US dollars (200 Swedish kronor) increased vaccination rates by 4.2 percentage points (P = 0.005), from a baseline rate of 71.6%. By contrast, behavioral nudges increased stated intentions to become vaccinated but had only small and not statistically significant impacts on vaccination rates. The results highlight the potential of modest monetary incentives to raise vaccination rates.

引用

页码：879 / +

页数：94

共 39 条

[1] Policies designed for self-interested citizens may undermine "the moral sentiments": Evidence from economic experiments [J].