Expectations-Driven Liquidity Traps: Implications for Monetary and Fiscal Policyt

被引:13
|
作者
Nakata, Taisuke [1 ]
Schmidt, Sebastian [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Tokyo, Fac Econ, Bunkyo City, Tokyo, Japan
[2] European Cent Bank, Monetary Policy Res Div, Frankfurt, Germany
[3] CEPR, Washington, DC USA
关键词
ZERO; COMMITMENT; PERILS;
D O I
10.1257/mac.20190228
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study optimal time-consistent monetary and fiscal policy in a New Keynesian model where occasional declines in agents' confi-dence give rise to persistent liquidity trap episodes. Insights from widely studied fundamental-driven liquidity traps are not a useful guide for enhancing welfare in this model. Raising the inflation tar-get, appointing an inflation-conservative central banker, or allowing for the use of government spending as an additional stabilization tool can exacerbate deflationary pressures and demand deficiencies during the liquidity trap episodes. However, appointing a policy -maker who is sufficiently less concerned with government spending stabilization than society eliminates expectations-driven liquidity traps. (JEL E31, E52, E61, E62, E63)
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页码:68 / 103
页数:36
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