Banks and German Corporate Governance: on the way to a capital market-based system?

被引：42
|
作者：
Hackethal, A
Schmidt, RH
Tyrell, M
机构：
[1] Univ Frankfurt, E Finance Lab, D-6000 Frankfurt, Germany
[2] Univ Frankfurt, Dept Finance, D-6000 Frankfurt, Germany
[3] Univ Trier, D-54286 Trier, Germany
来源：
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW | 2005年 / 13卷 / 03期
关键词：
corporate governance; banking system; co-determination; board of directors; complementarity; financial system;
D O I：
10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00434.x
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The German corporate governance system has long been cited as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. We argue that despite important reforms and substantial changes of individual elements of the German corporate governance system, the main characteristics of the traditional German system as a whole are still in place. However, in our opinion the changing role of big universal banks in governance undermines the stability of the corporate governance system in Germany. Therefore a breakdown of the traditional system leading to a control vacuum or a fundamental change to a capital market-based system could be in the offing.
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页码：397 / 407
页数：11
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