Common priors: A reply to Gul

被引:37
作者
Aumann, RJ [1 ]
机构
[1] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Inst Math, IL-91904 Jerusalem, Israel
[2] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Ctr Rat & Interact Decis Theory, IL-91904 Jerusalem, Israel
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2999579
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
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页码:929 / 938
页数:10
相关论文
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