Non-Agential Permissibility In Epistemology

被引:7
作者
Oliveira, Luis R. G. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003 USA
关键词
OUGHT;
D O I
10.1080/00048402.2014.1001415
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Paul Silva has recently argued that doxastic justification does not have a basing requirement. An important part of his argument depends crucially on the assumption that doxastic and moral permissibility have a parallel structure. I here reply to Silva's argument by challenging this crucial assumption. I claim that moral permissibility is an agential notion, while doxastic permissibility is not. I then briefly explore the nature of these notions and briefly consider their implications for praise and blame.
引用
收藏
页码:389 / 394
页数:6
相关论文
共 11 条