What conditional probability could not be

被引:205
作者
Hájek, A [1 ]
机构
[1] CALTECH, Pasadena, CA 91125 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1023/B:SYNT.0000004904.91112.16
中图分类号
N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;
摘要
Kolmogorov's axiomatization of probability includes the familiar ratio formula for conditional probability: (RATIO) P(A \ B) = P(A boolean AND B)/P(B) (P( B) > 0). Call this the ratio analysis of conditional probability. It has become so entrenched that it is often referred to as the definition of conditional probability. I argue that it is not even an adequate analysis of that concept. I prove what I call the Four Horn theorem, concluding that every probability assignment has uncountably many 'trouble spots'. Trouble spots come in four varieties: assignments of zero to genuine possibilities; assignments of infinitesimals to such possibilities; vague assignments to such possibilities; and no assignment whatsoever to such possibilities. Each sort of trouble spot can create serious problems for the ratio analysis. I marshal many examples from scientific and philosophical practice against the ratio analysis. I conclude more positively: we should reverse the traditional direction of analysis. Conditional probability should be taken as the primitive notion, and unconditional probability should be analyzed in terms of it.
引用
收藏
页码:273 / 323
页数:51
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