From bureaucratic capacity to legislation: how ministerial resources shape governments' policy-making capabilities

被引:10
作者
Klueser, K. Jonathan [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Zurich, Dept Polit Sci, Zurich, Switzerland
关键词
Ministerial government; policy making; ministerial bureaucracy; legislation; ministerial portfolios; PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION; COALITION AGREEMENTS; ELECTION PLEDGES; FULFILLMENT; PARTIES; GERMANY; BELGIUM; LOGIT; TIME;
D O I
10.1080/01402382.2022.2030602
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
How does ministries' capacity to draft legislation affect the political output of modern governments? This article combines a novel dataset describing the capacity of ministerial bureaucracies to attend to about 250 distinct policy issues with content-coded data on government legislation. The sample consists of Danish, Dutch and German governments, jointly spanning the time from 1995 to 2013. The analysis reveals three main findings: firstly, issue-specific bureaucratic capacity unconditionally increases governments' legislative activity; secondly, legislative activity is stifled if bureaucratic capacity is spread across different ministries; thirdly, against theoretical expectations the productive effect of bureaucratic capacity is not positively related to governments' issue salience. The results indicate that the design and resources of ministerial portfolios affect policy making in western governments. Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at:
引用
收藏
页码:347 / 373
页数:27
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