Voting by committees under constraints

被引：26

作者：

Barberà, S

Massó, J ^{[1
]}

Neme, A

机构：

[1] Univ Autonoma Barcelona, Dept Econ & Hist Econ, E-08193 Barcelona, Spain

[2] Univ Autonoma Barcelona, CODE, E-08193 Barcelona, Spain

[3] Univ Nacl San Luis, Inst Matemat Aplicada, RA-5700 San Luis, Argentina

[4] Consejo Nacl Invest Cient & Tecn, RA-5700 San Luis, Argentina

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2005年 / 122卷 / 02期

关键词：

voting; strategy-proofness; additive and separable preferences;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.006

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：185 / 205

页数：21

共 13 条

[1]

ANSWAL N, 2003, ECON THEOR, V22, P45

[2] Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges [J].