Product market competition and earnings management around open-market repurchase announcements

被引：8

作者：

Liao, Tsai-Ling ^{[1
]}

Lin, Wen-Chun ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Natl Formosa Univ, Coll Management, Dept Business Adm, 64 Wunhua Rd, Huwei Township 632, Yunlin, Taiwan

[2] Natl Taipei Univ Business, Dept Finance, 321,Sect 1,Jinan Rd, Taipei, Taiwan

来源：

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS & FINANCE | 2016年 / 44卷

关键词：

Accrual-based earnings management; Real earnings management; Product market competition; Sarbanes-Oxley Act; Share repurchases announcements; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; STOCK REPURCHASES; PERFORMANCE; INFORMATION; DISCLOSURE; ESSAYS; POWER; REAL;

D O I：

10.1016/j.iref.2016.04.006

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This study examines how market competition influences the extent and types of earnings management activities around share repurchase announcements. We find that repurchasing firms operating in more competitive industries conduct significantly less downward accrual-based and real activity management than those in less competitive industries. Furthermore, we document that both before and after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), the negative relation between market competition and real earnings management around repurchase announcements remains, while the negative relation between market competition and accrual based earnings management is only pronounced pre-SOX, but not post-SOX. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：187 / 203

页数：17

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