Promoting cooperation by punishing minority

被引：111

作者：

Yang, Han-Xin ^{[1
]}

Chen, Xiaojie ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Fuzhou Univ, Dept Phys, Fuzhou 350116, Fujian, Peoples R China

[2] Univ Elect Sci & Technol China, Sch Math Sci, Chengdu 611731, Sichuan, Peoples R China

来源：

APPLIED MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTATION | 2018年 / 316卷

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

Public goods game; Cooperation; Punishment; Majority; PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAME; PUBLIC-GOODS GAME; PUNISHMENT; REJECTION; MECHANISM; CHAOS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.amc.2017.08.049

中图分类号：

O29 [应用数学];

学科分类号：

070104 ;

摘要：

Punishment is an effective way to sustain cooperation among selfish individuals. In most of previous studies, objects of punishment are set to be defectors. In this paper, we propose a mechanism of punishment, in which individuals with the majority strategy will punish those with the minority strategy in a public goods game group. Both theoretical analysis and simulation show that the cooperation level can be greatly enhanced by punishing minority. For no punishment or small values of punishment fine, the fraction of cooperators continuously increases with the multiplication factor. However, for large values of punishment fine, there exists a critical value of multiplication factor, at which the fraction of cooperators suddenly jumps from 0 to 1. The density of different types of groups is also studied. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：460 / 466

页数：7

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