DEFAULT BELIEFS ON COLORS: THE METHODOLOGICAL VALUE OF WHAT WE BELIEVE TO KNOW ABOUT COLORS

被引：0

作者：

Txapartegi, Ekai

机构：

来源：

RIVISTA DI ESTETICA | 2010年 / 50卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

In this article I provide some reasons to justify why the preferable ontological account about colors is that which respects the highest number of beliefs contained in the so-called default position, keeping in mind the relative weight of each one of them. The full system of associated beliefs about colors contained in the default position is also offered.

引用

页码：213 / 229

页数：17

共 26 条

[1]

[Anonymous], 2000, Consciousness, Colour, and Content

[2]

Armstrong D.M., 1997, READINGS COLOR VOLUM, P33

[3] True colours, false theories (Colour-objectivism, colour-subjectivism) [J].