The influence of tie strength on evolutionary games on networks: An empirical investigation

被引:8
作者
Buesser, Pierre [1 ]
Pena, Jorge [2 ]
Pestelacci, Enea [1 ]
Tomassini, Marco [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Lausanne, Fac Business & Econ, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
[2] Univ Lausanne, Inst Appl Math, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
基金
瑞士国家科学基金会;
关键词
Evolutionary games; Complex networks; Weighted networks; PRISONERS-DILEMMA; COOPERATION; EMERGENCE;
D O I
10.1016/j.physa.2011.07.021
中图分类号
O4 [物理学];
学科分类号
0702 ;
摘要
Extending previous work on unweighted networks, we present here a systematic numerical investigation of standard evolutionary games on weighted networks. In the absence of any reliable model for generating weighted social networks, we attribute weights to links in a few ways supported by empirical data ranging from totally uncorrelated to weighted bipartite networks. The results of the extensive simulation work on standard complex network models show that, except in a case that does not seem to be common in social networks, taking the tie strength into account does not change in a radical manner the long-run steady-state behavior of the studied games. Besides model networks, we also included a real-life case drawn from a coauthorship network. In this case also, taking the weights into account only changes the results slightly with respect to the raw unweighted graph, although to draw more reliable conclusions on real social networks many more cases should be studied as these weighted networks become available. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:4502 / 4513
页数:12
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