Equilibrium in the Jungle

被引：58

作者：

Piccione, Michele ^{[1
]}

Rubinstein, Ariel

机构：

[1] Tel Aviv Univ, London Sch Econ, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel

[2] NYU, New York, NY USA

来源：

ECONOMIC JOURNAL | 2007年 / 117卷 / 522期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02072.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In the jungle, power and coercion govern the exchange of resources. We study a simple, stylised model of the jungle that mirrors an exchange economy. We define the notion of jungle equilibrium and demonstrate that a number of standard results of competitive markets hold in the jungle.

引用

页码：883 / 896

页数：14

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