Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing

被引：37

作者：

Ausubel, LM ^{[1
]}

Cramton, P ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Maryland, Dept Econ, College Pk, MD 20742 USA

来源：

ECONOMIC THEORY | 2004年 / 23卷 / 03期

关键词：

auctions; Vickrey auctions; multi-unit auctions; reserve price; resale;

D O I：

10.1007/s00199-003-0398-8

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We generalize the Vickrey auction to allow for reserve pricing in a multi-unit auction with interdependent values. In the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing, the seller determines the quantity to be made available as a function of the bidders' reports of private information, and then efficiently allocates this quantity among the bidders. Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy with private values and an ex post equilibrium with interdependent values. If the auction is followed by resale, then truthful bidding remains an equilibrium in the auction-plus-resale game. In settings with perfect resale, the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing maximizes seller revenues.

引用

页码：493 / 505

页数：13

共 19 条

[1]

[Anonymous], 9607 U MAR

[2]

Ausubel L.M., 1999, OPTIMALITY BEING EFF

[3]

AUSUBEL LM, 1999, MECH GEN VICREY AUTI

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