Unraveling the processes underlying evaluation: Attitudes from the perspective of the ape model

被引:188
作者
Gawronski, Bertram [1 ]
Bodenhausen, Galen V.
机构
[1] Univ Western Ontario, Social Sci Ctr, Dept Psychol, London, ON N6A 5C2, Canada
[2] Northwestern Univ, Dept Psychol, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1521/soco.2007.25.5.687
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
The present article provides an analysis of the attitude construct from the perspective of the Associative-Propositional Evaluation Model (APE Model). It is argued that evaluative responses should be understood in terms of their underlying mental processes: associative and propositional processes. Whereas associative processes are characterized by mere activation, independent of subjective truth or falsity, propositional reasoning is concerned with the validation of evaluations and beliefs. Associative processes are claimed to provide the basis for primitive affective reactions; propositional processes are assumed to form the basis for evaluative judgments. Implications of this conceptualization for a variety of questions are discussed, such as automatic features of attitudes, processes of attitude formation and change, attitude representation in memory, context-sensitivity and stability of attitudes, and the difference between personal and cultural evaluations.
引用
收藏
页码:687 / 717
页数:31
相关论文
共 106 条
[31]   Attitudes as object-evaluation associations of varying strength [J].
Fazio, Russell H. .
SOCIAL COGNITION, 2007, 25 (05) :603-637
[32]  
Fazio RussellH., 1995, Attitude Strength: Antecedents and Consequences, P247, DOI DOI 10.1521/SOCO.2007.25.5.603
[33]  
FESTINGER L., 1964, CONFLICT DECIS DISSO
[34]  
Fishbein M., 1975, Beliefs, Attitude, Intention and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and Research
[35]   When do associations matter? The use of automatic associations toward ethnic groups in person judgments [J].
Florack, A ;
Scarabis, M ;
Bless, H .
JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2001, 37 (06) :518-524
[36]  
Frey D., 1986, ADV EXPT SOCIAL PSYC, V19, P41, DOI [10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60212-9, DOI 10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60212-9]
[37]   On the propositional nature of cognitive consistency: Dissonance changes explicit, but not implicit attitudes [J].
Gawronski, B ;
Strack, F .
JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2004, 40 (04) :535-542
[38]  
GAWRONSKI B, 2006, UNDERSTANDING REALTI
[39]  
GAWRONSKI B, IN PRESS ATTITUDE IN
[40]  
GAWRONSKI B, 2007, IMPLICIT MEASURES AT