Ideological Signaling and Incumbency Advantage

被引:12
|
作者
Peskowitz, Zachary [1 ]
机构
[1] Emory Univ, Dept Polit Sci, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA
关键词
congressional elections; candidate experience; incumbency advantage; ELECTORAL COMPETITION; HOUSE ELECTIONS; VOTER WELFARE; US; SELECTION; DECLINE; SENATE; POLICY;
D O I
10.1017/S0007123416000557
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
This article develops a novel explanation for the incumbency advantage based on incumbents' ability to signal positions that are ideologically distinct from those of their parties. Using voter-level data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study and controlling for unobserved district heterogeneity, the study finds that voters in US House elections primarily use information about the ideology of candidates' parties to infer the location of challengers, while they instead rely on information about the individual candidates' ideologies to place incumbents. In higher-profile Senate elections, the difference between challengers and incumbents is trivial. Decomposing the incumbency advantage into valence and signaling components, the study finds that the signaling mechanism explains 14 per cent of the incumbency advantage in House elections, but only 5 per cent of the advantage in Senate contests. It also finds that a 50 per cent increase in party polarization increases the incumbency advantage by 3 percentage points.
引用
收藏
页码:467 / 490
页数:24
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