This article develops a novel explanation for the incumbency advantage based on incumbents' ability to signal positions that are ideologically distinct from those of their parties. Using voter-level data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study and controlling for unobserved district heterogeneity, the study finds that voters in US House elections primarily use information about the ideology of candidates' parties to infer the location of challengers, while they instead rely on information about the individual candidates' ideologies to place incumbents. In higher-profile Senate elections, the difference between challengers and incumbents is trivial. Decomposing the incumbency advantage into valence and signaling components, the study finds that the signaling mechanism explains 14 per cent of the incumbency advantage in House elections, but only 5 per cent of the advantage in Senate contests. It also finds that a 50 per cent increase in party polarization increases the incumbency advantage by 3 percentage points.
机构:
Northwestern Univ, Polit Sci, Evanston, IL USA
Northwestern Univ, Inst Policy Res, Evanston, IL USANorthwestern Univ, Polit Sci, Evanston, IL USA
Druckman, James N.
Kifer, Martin J.
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High Point Univ, Polit Sci, High Point, NC USA
High Point Univ, Interdisciplinary Survey Res Ctr, High Point, NC USANorthwestern Univ, Polit Sci, Evanston, IL USA
Kifer, Martin J.
Parkin, Michael
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Oberlin Coll, Polit, Oberlin, OH 44074 USANorthwestern Univ, Polit Sci, Evanston, IL USA
机构:
Harvard Univ, Polit Econ & Govt, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAHarvard Univ, Polit Econ & Govt, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Ban, Pamela
Llaudet, Elena
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机构:
Harvard Univ, Inst Quantitat Social Sci, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Harvard Univ, Dept Govt, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAHarvard Univ, Polit Econ & Govt, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Llaudet, Elena
Snyder, James M., Jr.
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Harvard Univ, Hist & Polit Sci Govt Dept, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
NBER, Barcelona, SpainHarvard Univ, Polit Econ & Govt, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA