Local peers and firm misconduct: The role of sustainability and competition

被引:11
作者
Rind, Asad Ali [1 ,5 ]
Abbassi, Wajih [2 ]
Allaya, Manel [3 ]
Hammouda, Amira [4 ]
机构
[1] IQRA Univ, Dept Business Adm, Karachi, Pakistan
[2] Univ Paris Est Creteil, Inst Rech Gest, Creteil, France
[3] Univ Portsmouth, Portsmouth Business Sch, Portsmouth, Hampshire, England
[4] South Champagne Business Sch, Y Sch, Troyes, France
[5] IQRA Univ, Karachi 75300, Pakistan
关键词
Peer effects; Corporate misbehavior; Corporate social responsibility; Sustainability; Competition; CORPORATE SOCIAL-RESPONSIBILITY; HEADQUARTERS LOCATION MATTER; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; REPUTATIONAL PENALTY; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; ANALYST COVERAGE; AGENCY COSTS; FRAUD; MARKET; INCENTIVES;
D O I
10.1016/j.econmod.2022.106000
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Prior research shows that firms' geographical location is critical for financial decisions. However, it is still unclear whether firms mimic the unethical behavior of their local peers and whether firms' corporate social responsibility (CSR) and product market competition mitigate such behavior. We examine a US sample of 23,605 observations and find that firms' likelihood of misconduct is positively related to the average level of misconduct in the local metropolitan area. The analysis shows that firms with strong CSR do not mimic their local peers' fraudulent behavior. However, firms operating in industries with greater competition imitate their local peers' unethical behavior. The channel analysis reveals that fraudulent peer effects are only prevalent in small firms, young firms, and those with low institutional ownership, suggesting that information asymmetry and weak monitoring drive our findings. The results also suggest stakeholders should pay more attention to firms operating in areas where misconduct is widespread.
引用
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页数:16
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