Personal Identity and the Hybrid View: A Middle Way

被引：1
作者：
Noonan, Harold W. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Nottingham, Dept Philosophy, Nottingham NG7 2RD, England
来源：
METAPHYSICA-INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR ONTOLOGY & METAPHYSICS | 2021年 / 22卷 / 02期
关键词：
personal identity; animalism; neo-Lockeanism; only x and y principle;
D O I：
10.1515/mp-2020-0007
中图分类号：
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要：
Two of the main contenders in the debate about personal persistence over time are the neo-Lockean psychological continuity view and animalism as defended by Olson and Snowdon. Both are wrong. The position I shall argue for, which I call, following Olson, the hybrid view, takes (non-branching) psychological continuity as a sufficient but, pace the neo-Lockeans, not necessary condition for personal persistence. It sides with the animalist in allowing that mere (non-branching) biological continuity is also sufficient. So I am, in a sense, a psychological continuity theorist. But I am also in a sense, a biological theorist (or as Olson put it, a new animalist).
引用
收藏
页码：263 / 283
页数：21
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