RETRACTED: Beyond moral dilemmas: The role of reasoning in five categories of utilitarian judgment (Retracted article. See vol. 216, 2021)

Over the past two decades, the study of moral reas ning has een heavily influenced by Joshua Greene's dualprocess model of moral judgment, according t which deonto ogical judgments are typically supported by intuitive, automatic processes while utilitarian judgments are typically supported by reflective, conscious processes. However, most of the evidence g hered in uppot of this model comes from the study of people's judgments about sacrificial dilemmas, such a Trolley Problems. To which extent does this model generalize to other debates in which deontological and utilitarian judgments conflict, such as the existence of harmless moral violations, the difference between actions and omissions, the extent of our duties of assistance, and the appropriate justification for punishme t? To find out, we conducted a series of five studies on the role of reflection in these kinds of moral conundrums In Study 1 participants were asked to answer under cognitive load. In Study 2, participants had to answr under a tric time constraint. In Studies 3 to 5, we sought to promote reflection through exposure to counter-in itive reasoning problems or direct instruction. Overall, our results offer strong support to the extension of Greene's dual-process model to moral debates on the existence of harmless violations and partial sup ort t its ex ension to moral debates on the extent of our duties of assistance.