Promoting the polluters? The competing objectives of energy efficiency, pollutant emissions, and economic performance in Chinese municipalities

被引:52
作者
Jiang Qisheng [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Yang Shuwang [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Tang Pengcheng [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Bao Lei [1 ,2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] China Univ Geosci, Econ & Management Coll, Wuhan 430074, Peoples R China
[2] China Univ Geosci, Econ & Environm Res Ctr, Wuhan 430074, Peoples R China
[3] Minist Land & Resources, Key Lab Strateg Studies, Wuhan 430074, Peoples R China
关键词
Energy efficiency; Pollutant emissions; Economic performance; Promotion Tournament; Promotion incentive; Evolution trend; 11TH 5-YEAR PLAN; FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION; POLITICAL CENTRALIZATION; WATER-POLLUTION; LAND TRANSFER; WIND ENERGY; INCENTIVES; GROWTH; IMPLEMENTATION; DECOMPOSITION;
D O I
10.1016/j.erss.2019.101365
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
With the rapid development of China's economy, energy efficiency and pollutant emissions have also entered our horizons and become two big issues. To explore the impacts that these three factors have on the promotion probability of municipal party secretaries, we have collected the data of 810 municipal party secretaries with position changes in the period of 2005-2015 and mainly adopted the probit model to conduct our empirical tests. Our results are as follows: (1) Higher economic performance, higher energy efficiency and lower pollution emissions can significantly increase the promotion probability of municipal party secretaries; (2) these three correlations evolve differently, the impact of economic performance declines slightly but always predominates, the impact of pollutant emission tends to grow while that of energy efficiency continues to decrease. This research provides a dynamic understanding of Chinese local officials' promotion incentive and their trade-off among economy, energy and environment, which would be a valuable supplement for Institution Change Theory and an important reference for other countries with similar developing dilemma.
引用
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页数:10
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