On the pro-competitive effects of passive partial backward ownership

被引：5

作者：

Alipranti, Maria ^{[1
]}

Petrakis, Emmanuel ^{[2
,3
]}

Skartados, Panagiotis ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece

[2] Univ Crete, Rethimnon, Greece

[3] Univ Carlos III Madrid, Madrid, Spain

[4] Athens Univ Econ & Business, Athens, Greece

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2022年 / 213卷

关键词：

Passive partial backward ownership; Vertical relations; Two-part tariffs; Interim observable contracts; VERTICAL INTEGRATION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110376

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We consider a vertically related market where an upstream monopolist supplier trades, via interim observable two-part tariff contracts, with two differentiated downstream Cournot competitors. We show that passive partial backward ownership (PPBO) is pro-competitive and welfare enhancing. PPBO exacerbates the upstream monopolist's commitment problem and yields lower wholesale prices, and higher industry output, consumers surplus, and welfare than in the absence of PPBO. (C) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页数：5

共 25 条

[1] Disclosure standards for vertical contracts [J].