Endogenous information, adverse selection, and prevention: Implications for genetic testing policy

We examine public policy toward the use of genetic information by insurers. Individuals engage in unobservable primary prevention and have access to different prevention technologies. Thus, insurance markets are affected by moral hazard and adverse selection. Individuals can choose to take a genetic test to acquire information about their prevention technology. Information has positive decision-making value, that is, individuals may adjust their behavior based on the result of the test. However, testing also exposes individuals to uncertainty over the available insurance contract, so-called classification risk, which lowers the value of information. In our analysis we distinguish between four different policy regimes, determine the value of information under each regime and associated equilibrium outcomes on the insurance market. We show that the policy regimes can be Pareto ranked, with a duty to disclose being the preferred regime and an information ban the least preferred one. (C)2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.