Time as image of eternity: AF Losev's criticism of subjectivist conceptions of time

The paper analyses Aleksei F. Losev's position in respect to the notion of time, which he considers in a dialectical perspective. The Russian philosopher proceeds from the Platonic interpretation of the relationship between the one and the many, according to which each plurality carries in itself a unifying principle, as its ontological grounding. This anti-modern perspective represents a rejection of the positivist "objectification" of the world, which introduced the "metaphysical" notions of absolute space and time. According to Losev, time as an indefinite continued progress of events that occur in an apparently irreversible succession (from the past, through the present, into the future) does not exist as such and cannot be considered other than within the framework of the overall unity of temporal fragments, so that they acquire a common background. By placing the interpretation of time on the ontological plan, in its dialectical connection with its opposite (eternity), Losev manages to overcome the problem of the measurability of time, raised in Aristotle's definition of time as a "measure of motion." Losev also rejects modern subjectivist ideas about time as an experience of the present (Husserl) or as pure duration (Bergson), both conceptions inevitably leading to the problem of identifying in the continuous flow of time a stable (extratemporal) ground that serves as the basis for any temporal change. Besides that, Losev's approach to the interpretation of time leads to criticism of the modern idea of progress, understood as an endless striving for the future, which always remains unattainable. The main task then is to find "mobile rest," a unifying principle that can give meaning to human existence through the combination of past, present and future.