Locke on Knowing Our Own Ideas (and Ourselves)

被引:1
作者
Weinberg, Shelley [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Illinois, Dept Philosophy, Champaign, IL 61820 USA
关键词
SENSITIVE KNOWLEDGE; PROPOSITIONS; JUDGMENT; ARNAULD;
D O I
10.1111/papq.12066
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Locke defines knowledge as the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Nevertheless, he claims that we know particular things: the identity of our ideas, our own existence, and the existence of external objects. Although much has been done to reconcile the definition of knowledge with our knowledge of external objects, there is virtually nothing in the scholarship when it comes to knowing ideas or our own existence. I fill in this gap by arguing that perceptions of ideas are complex mental states that convey propositional knowledge due to agreeing elements therein.
引用
收藏
页码:347 / 370
页数:24
相关论文
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