Executive compensation: A multidisciplinary review of recent developments

被引:334
作者
Devers, Cynthia E. [1 ]
Cannella, Albert A., Jr.
Reilly, Gregory P.
Yoder, Michele E.
机构
[1] Univ Wisconsin, Sch Business, Madison, WI 53706 USA
[2] Tulane Univ, AB Freeman Sch Business, New Orleans, LA 70118 USA
[3] Univ Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269 USA
[4] Univ Wisconsin, Sch Business, Madison, WI 53706 USA
关键词
executive compensation; compensation design; incentive pay; corporate governance; risk; agency theory; behavioral theory;
D O I
10.1177/0149206307308588
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The failure to document a consistent and robust relationship between executive pay and firm performance has frustrated scholars and practitioners for over three quarters of a century. Although recent compensation research has revealed alternative theoretical frameworks and findings that hold the potential to significantly improve our understanding of executive compensation, to date this diverse literature lacks theoretical integration. Accordingly, we develop a framework to organize and review these recent findings. We further identify methodological issues and concerns, discuss the implications of these concerns, and provide recommendations for future research aimed at developing a more integrated research agenda.
引用
收藏
页码:1016 / 1072
页数:57
相关论文
共 140 条
[11]   An empirical analysis of continuing improvements following the implementation of a performance-based compensation plan [J].
Banker, RD ;
Lee, SY ;
Potter, G ;
Srinivasan, D .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2000, 30 (03) :315-350
[12]  
BARKER ADP, 1998, TESTS AGROCHEMICALS, V19, P6
[13]   Executive rank, pay and project selection [J].
Barron, JM ;
Waddell, GR .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2003, 67 (02) :305-349
[14]  
Bebchuk L. A., 2004, BERKELEY BUSINESS LA, V1, P291
[15]   Wealth and executive compensation [J].
Becker, B .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2006, 61 (01) :379-397
[16]  
BERGMAN N, 2005, 450404 MIT SLOAN SCH
[17]   CEO incentives and earnings management [J].
Bergstresser, Daniel ;
Philippon, Thomas .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2006, 80 (03) :511-529
[18]   Capital budgeting and compensation with asymmetric information and moral hazard [J].
Bernardo, AE ;
Cai, HB ;
Luo, J .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2001, 61 (03) :311-344
[19]   Exercise behavior, valuation, and the incentive effects of employee stock options [J].
Bettis, JC ;
Bizjak, JM ;
Lemmon, ML .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2005, 76 (02) :445-470
[20]   Testing agency theory with entrepreneur effort and wealth [J].
Bitler, MP ;
Moskowitz, TJ ;
Vissing-Jorgensen, A .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2005, 60 (02) :539-576