A novel approach to studying strategic decisions with eye-tracking and machine learning

被引:1
作者
Krol, Michal [1 ]
Krol, Magdalena [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Manchester, Dept Econ, Oxford Rd, Manchester M13 9PL, Lancs, England
[2] Univ Social Sci & Humanties Wroclaw, Aleksandra Ostrowskiego 30b, PL-53238 Wroclaw, Poland
来源
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING | 2017年 / 12卷 / 06期
关键词
task recognition; eye-tracking; strategic games; machine learning; PROFESSIONALS PLAY MINIMAX; MOVEMENT PATTERNS; VISUAL FIXATIONS; GAMES; CHOICE; BEHAVIOR; SEARCH; EQUILIBRIA; WIMBLEDON; ATTENTION;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
We propose a novel method of using eye-tracking to study strategic decisions. The conventional approach is to hypothesize what eye-patterns should be observed if a given model of decision-making was accurate, and then proceed to verify if this occurs. When such hypothesis specification is difficult a priori, we propose instead to expose subjects to a variant of the original strategic task that should induce processing it in a way consistent with the postulated model. It is then possible to use machine learning pattern recognition techniques to check if the associated eye-patterns are similar to those recorded during the original task. We illustrate the method using simple examples of 2x2 matching-pennies and coordination games with or without feedback about the counterparts' past moves. We discuss the strengths and limitations of the method in this context.
引用
收藏
页码:596 / 609
页数:14
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