Transplant quality and patients' preferences in paired kidney exchange

被引：12

作者：

Nicolo, Antonio ^{[2
]}

Rodriguez-Alvarez, Carmelo ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Complutense Madrid, Fac CC Econ & Empresariales, Madrid 28223, Spain

[2] Univ Padua, Dipartamento Sci Econ Marco Fanno, I-35123 Padua, Italy

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2012年 / 74卷 / 01期

关键词：

Market design; Matching; Kidney exchange; Protective behavior; RENAL-TRANSPLANTATION; STRATEGY-PROOFNESS; SURVIVAL BENEFIT; RECIPIENT CHOICE; COMPATIBILITY; ALLOCATION; ALGORITHM; MECHANISM; DONATION; OUTCOMES;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.009

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Paired Kidney Exchange (PKE) programs solve incompatibility problems of donor-patient pairs in living donor kidney transplantation by arranging exchanges of donors among several pairs. Further efficiency gains may emerge if the programs consider the quality of the matches between patients and donors. Limitations on the number of simultaneous required operations imply that every efficient PKE program introduces incentives for the patients to misreport how they rank the option of remaining in dialysis with respect to the available kidneys. Truthfully revealing their preferences is however, the unique protective (lexicographic maximin) strategy for patients under pairwise exchange maximizing PKE programs. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：299 / 310

页数：12

共 45 条

[1] RATIONAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS AND ORDERINGS [J].