Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems

被引：14

作者：

Carlier, G ^{[1
]}

Dana, RA ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Paris 09, CEREMADE, CNRS, UMR 7534, F-75775 Paris, France

来源：

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS | 2005年 / 41卷 / 07期

关键词：

moral hazard; first-order approach; Rearrangements; supermodularity;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jmateco.2004.08.002

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper provides a method to prove existence of solutions to some moral hazard problems with infinite set of outcomes. The argument is based on the concept of nondecreasing rearrangement and on a supermodular version of Hardy-Littlewood's inequality. The method also provides qualitative properties of solutions. Both the cases of wage contracts and of insurance contracts are studied. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved.

引用

页码：826 / 843

页数：18

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