Gundy v. United States: A Revival of the Nondelegation Doctrine and an Embrace of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental Rulemaking

被引:2
作者
Gimre, Kerensa [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Sch Law, Boalt Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
关键词
D O I
10.15779/Z383R0PT9M
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
After Gundy v. United States, the Supreme Court is poised to dramatically roll back the power of administrative agencies through a reinvigoration of the nondelegation doctrine. This will substantially restrict the ability of agencies, particularly the Environmental Protection Agency, to promulgate environmental regulations and will render large swaths of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act unconstitutional. Cost-benefit analysis may be a useful tool for the Environmental Protection Agency to justify its environmental regulations under a revived nondelegation doctrine, yet increased use of cost-benefit analysis creates new concerns over policing its biases and the separation of power. Despite these concerns, cost-benefit analysis may be the best tool to meet the standards of a more discerning Court under a reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine.
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页码:339 / 369
页数:31
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