Large-Scale Multi-Agent Deep FBSDEs

被引:0
作者
Chen, Tianrong [1 ]
Wang, Ziyi [2 ]
Exarchos, Ioannis [3 ]
Theodorou, Evangelos A. [2 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Georgia Inst Technol, Sch Elect & Comp Engn, Atlanta, GA 30332 USA
[2] Georgia Inst Technol, Ctr Machine Learning, Atlanta, GA 30332 USA
[3] Stanford Univ, Dept Comp Sci, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[4] Georgia Inst Technol, Sch Aerosp Engn, Atlanta, GA 30332 USA
来源
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MACHINE LEARNING, VOL 139 | 2021年 / 139卷
关键词
STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL-GAMES;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
In this paper we present a scalable deep learning framework for finding Markovian Nash Equilibria in multi-agent stochastic games using fictitious play. The motivation is inspired by theoretical analysis of Forward Backward Stochastic Differential Equations (FBSDE) and their implementation in a deep learning setting, which is the source of our algorithm's sample efficiency improvement. By taking advantage of the permutation-invariant property of agents in symmetric games, the scalability and performance is further enhanced significantly. We showcase superior performance of our framework over the state-of-the-art deep fictitious play algorithm on an inter-bank lending/borrowing problem in terms of multiple metrics. More importantly, our approach scales up to 3000 agents in simulation, a scale which, to the best of our knowledge, represents a new state-of-the-art. We also demonstrate the applicability of our framework in robotics on a belief space autonomous racing problem.
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页数:9
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