Do business group firms use related party transactions efficiently? An empirical study

被引:2
作者
Tripathi, Nitya Nand [1 ,2 ]
Raj, Asha Binu [2 ,3 ]
Sireesha, P. Bhanu [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] ICFAI Business Sch IBS, Dept Finance & Accounting, Hyderabad, India
[2] Icfai Fdn Higher Educ Deemed Univ US 3 UGC Act 19, Hyderabad, India
[3] ICFAI Business Sch Ibs, Dept Human Resource Management & Soft Skills, Human Resource Management, Org Behav, Hyderabad, India
关键词
Related party transactions; corporate governance; business group; stand-alone; Clause; 49; efficient transactions; opportunistic transactions; corporate governance index; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; OWNERSHIP; PERFORMANCE; COMPANIES; KOREA;
D O I
10.1080/17520843.2022.2033442
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We examine the nature of related party transactions between business group and stand-alone companies and its impact on the firm performance. The magnitude of related party transactions varies across the Indian firms, however, prior approval is required from audit committee. Hence, we examine the empirical relationship between related party transactions, firm performance, and corporate governance for the period 2003-2016. We find that some related party transactions turn as efficient transactions. Some transactions arise as opportunistic transactions which are not supported by any of the corporate governance proxies. We suggest that the audit committees and independent directors scrutinize those transactions appropriately.
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页数:23
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