Excess executive compensation and corporate governance in the United Kingdom and Spain: A comparative analysis

被引：6

作者：

Sanchez-Marin, Gregorio ^{[1
]}

Encarnacion Lucas-Perez, Maria ^{[2
]}

Baixauli-Soler, Samuel ^{[2
]}

Main, Brian G. M. ^{[3
]}

Minguez-Vera, Antonio ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Alcala, Dept Econ & Business, Madrid, Spain

[2] Univ Murcia, Dept Management & Finance, Murcia, Spain

[3] Univ Edinburgh, Business Sch, Edinburgh, Midlothian, Scotland

来源：

MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS | 2022年 / 43卷 / 07期

关键词：

MANAGEMENT TEAM COMPENSATION; CEO COMPENSATION; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; FIRM VALUE; MARKET VALUATION; PAY VOTES; PERFORMANCE; SAY; UK;

D O I：

10.1002/mde.3564

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Literature on executive compensation has relatively neglected the impact of institutional governance contexts. Regarding filling this gap, this study examines the influence of governance mechanisms on excess executive compensation comparing a set of listed UK and Spanish firms on an 8-year panel data. Findings indicate that Spanish firms are characterized by higher excess executive compensation than UK firms because of the less effectiveness of ownership structure and board of directors. Differences in concentration and structure of ownership as well as in composition and size of boards result in more aligned executive compensation design in the UK firms.

引用

页码：2817 / 2837

页数：21

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