General elections modelled with infinitely many voters

被引：0

作者：

Ekes, M ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Polish Acad Sci, Warsaw Sch Econ, PL-00901 Warsaw, Poland

[2] Polish Acad Sci, Inst Comp Sci, PL-00901 Warsaw, Poland

来源：

CONTROL AND CYBERNETICS | 2003年 / 32卷 / 01期

关键词：

general elections; equilibrium; preference-indiffer relation;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

The paper examines a model of general elections with electorate composed of infinitely many voters classified into a finite number of types. We focus on the case of elections among two candidates, we give a full characterization of equilibria in such models and we classify equilibria with respect to their stability.

引用

页码：163 / 173

页数：11

共 13 条

[1]

[Anonymous], 1978, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIO

[2]

BRAMS S, 1976, PARADOXES POLITICS I

[3]

EKES M, 1999, THESIS WARSAW SCH EC

[4] Minimax apportionments [J].

Gambarelli, G .

GROUP DECISION AND NEGOTIATION, 1999, 8 (06) :441-461

[5]

HOLUBIEC JW, 1999, GRUPOWE PODEJMOWANIE, P81

[6]

Kramer G., 1978, GAME THEORY POLITICA, P375

[7] CONDITIONS FOR VOTING EQUILIBRIA IN CONTINUOUS VOTER DISTRIBUTIONS [J].

MCKELVEY, RD ;

ORDESHOOK, PC ;

UNGAR, P .

SIAM JOURNAL ON APPLIED MATHEMATICS, 1980, 39 (01) :161-168

[8]

MERCIK JW, 1999, GRUPOWE PODEJMOWANIE, P123

[9] A THEORY OF VOTING EQUILIBRIA [J].

MYERSON, RB ;

WEBER, RJ .

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1993, 87 (01) :102-114

[10] ON THE DIFFICULTY OF MAKING SOCIAL CHOICES [J].

NURMI, H .

THEORY AND DECISION, 1995, 38 (01) :99-119

← 1 2 →